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ISSUE & SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
There is a general consensus in international law to legally classify participants in
armed conflict as civilians, combatants, hors de combat, or prisoners of war. In the Sierra
Leonean conflict, many of the rebel forces relied on forced conscription, especially of
children, to populate their armies.* International Humanitarian Law protects children
from forced conscription, but there are no similar protections for those not considered
children. In determining the legal status of these forced recruits, a threshold question
must be answered: Is the armed conflict of an international or internal nature? For
internal armed conflicts, there are fewer provisions in place to protect civilians and
combatants. However, many in the international community would argue that the
provisions that apply to international armed conflict, mainly the Four Geneva
Conventions and additional protocols, are part of customary international law, and
thereby, applicable to internal conflicts.
A)

If the Sierra Leonean conflict were classified as an internal armed
conflict, then the forced recruits would be considered civilians.1

Assuming that the Sierra Leonean conflict is only an internal conflict, it appears
that the forced recruits would be considered civilians and would be afforded some

*

“Regarding civilians over 15 years of age who are captured and forced to join an
organized group [where escape is threatened with death, mutilation, beatings], what is the
impact of this forced recruitment and use of adults in the organized group on the
individual's status as a civilian? At what point does the impact, if any, of the
circumstances of the capture and forced recruitment cease to be of legal effect?”
1

See Section I, Part C: The Sierra Leonean conflict is usually viewed as an internal
armed conflict. Thus, if it is an internal conflict, forced recruits are not afforded
combatant status under Protocol I,” infra at p. 9.
1

protections under Common Article 3 and Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
However, if the forced recruits actually participated in the hostilities, the recruits would
lose their civilian immunity for so long as they engaged in hostilities. Nonetheless, this
type of activity would not affect the legal classification of the forced recruit as a civilian.
B)

If the Sierra Leonean conflict is deemed “internationlized,” and in
turn, Protocol I is applicable, then the forced recruits could be
considered either civilians or combatants, depending upon the type of
activity.2

Assuming that Protocol I is applicable to the Sierra Leonean conflict, the legal
classification of a forced recruit seems to depend upon the type of activity performed and
his “official incorporation” into the armed forces. Generally, all members of the armed
forces are combatants, and only members of the armed forces are combatants. Thus, in
order to be classified as a combatant, the forced recruit must be incorporated in some way
into the armed forces. If the forced recruit is not considered a combatant, then he
likewise must be a civilian. (The international legal community does not recognize
quasi-combatant status).
There are advantages to classification as either a civilian or a combatant. A
civilian is generally afforded immunity and protection from any targeted military attacks.
On the other hand, a combatant gives up this “immunity” for the privilege to take part in
hostilities.

2

See “Section II: Protocol I delineates between Civilians and Combatants.”, infra at p.
20.
2

C)

The forced recruits engaging in hostilities are most likely not
considered enslaved—nonetheless, enslavement does not affect the
forced recruit’s legal classification as a civilian or combatant.3

Enslavement, as a crime against humanity, is generally defined as a widespread
and systematic attack against a civilian population. However, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognized that combatants can also be victims of
crimes against humanity. Enslavement, a crime against humanity, necessarily requires a
captor to exert “ownership” over the forced recruit. Jurisprudence suggests that
enslavement has been extended to forced female recruits who were deprived of their
liberty and freedom. These female recruits were often forced into marriages and sexual
slavery. However, there is no jurisprudence that suggests that forced recruits
participating in hostilities are considered enslaved.
However, forced labour, which is defined as involuntary work, can be applied to
forced recruitment. While there is a general exception to forced military conscription,
there is no law setting forth legal conscription in Sierra Leone—therefore, the forced
recruits could be required to perform forced labour. This labour, however, would not
affect the underlying status as a civilian or a combatant.

3

See “Section III: Enslavement and forced labour do not affect a forced recruit’s legal
status.”, infra at p. 31.
3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the Sierra Leonean conflict of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the
rebel forces relied on child conscription and forced recruitment to staff much of their
armies.4 The international community was outraged by this human rights violations and
adopted conventions in order to protect children during periods of armed conflict.5 The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, recognizing the delicate issue of child soldiers, adopted a
statute that provided for jurisdiction over persons who were at least fifteen years of age.6
However, the protections afforded to forced recruits who were children did not extend to
forced recruits who were above the age threshold. In addition, it is unclear if these forced
recruits can receive protections that are provided based on one’s legal classification either
as a civilian, combatant, or prisoner of war.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I)

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ARGUABLY GOVERNS
THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE. THEREFORE, ALL FOUR
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT PROTOCOLS SHOULD
BE APPLICABLE TO THE SIERRA LEONEAN CONFLICT.
A)

The Geneva Conventions have limited applicability based on the type
of armed conflict.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent Protocols are becoming
increasingly irrelevant in a world torn apart by internal armed conflicts. Created post-

4

Jon M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and Compensation,
29 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 77, 78 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 30].
5

Id. at 80–82.

6

Statue for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2002).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 15].
4

World War II, the Conventions were mostly concerned with wars between countries, and
therefore, wars of an international nature.7 Thus, many of the protections and rights
extended to civilians and combatants apply only during international armed conflict.
However, the world today is more familiar with internal armed conflicts—like the armed
conflict in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, even though civil wars present similar atrocities
as international wars, only a few provisions from the 1949 Geneva Conventions govern
internal armed conflicts.8 These provisions include Common Article 3 and Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“Protocol II”).9 “These provisions offer
little protection to combatants and civilians in conventional civil wars, resulting in an

7

Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Humanitarian
Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 916, 918 (1994). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 32].
8

Id.

9

See generally Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
(hereinafter “First Geneva Convention”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 6]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter “Second Geneva Convention”). [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 7]; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 8]; and Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter “Fourth Geneva Convention”) (hereinafter collectively referred
to as “1949 Geneva Conventions”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 9];
see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter “Protocol II”). [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 12].
5

unfortunate disparity between the protections afforded during international [conflicts
when compared with] internal conflicts.”10
Characterization of the type of armed conflict is important in order to determine
which parts of international humanitarian law apply.11 Typically, an international armed
conflict involves two different sovereign States engaging in hostilities, whereas an
internal armed conflict involves the armed forces of a State and other forces within the
same State.12 Primarily, the Four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols
govern international armed conflicts, whereas only Common Article 3 and Protocol II
govern internal armed conflicts.13
Individual states are unwilling to fully extend all of the Geneva Conventions to
internal armed conflicts.14 By its very nature, the Conventions, as part of international

10

Lopez, supra note 7, at 918. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 32].

11

Babafemi Akinrinade, International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra
Leone, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 391, 408 (2001). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 24]. There is no question that the conflict in Sierra
Leone is designated as an armed conflict—the key question is whether the conflict is an
international armed conflict or an internal armed conflict. Armed conflicts in general are
defined as “armed confrontations between: 1) two or more States; 2) a State and a body
other than a State; 3) a State and a dissident faction; and 4) two ethnic factions within a
State. Id., at 409 (citing Pierto Vieri, Dictionary of the International Law of Armed
Conflict 34 (Edward Markee & Susan Mutti trans., Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross 1992)).
See also Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct 2, 1995) (stating an armed conflict is
“protracted violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab
22].
12

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 410. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].

13

Id.

14

See generally William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The
European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741, 757 (2005).
6

humanitarian law, conflict with state sovereignty by placing the rights of individuals over
the rights of states.15 In fact, some States believe that providing legal protections to rebel
groups by classifying them as combatants under international humanitarian law would
encourage more insurgencies and rebellions against their own State governments. Thus,
characterizing the armed conflict as an international or internal conflict has significant
consequences on application of the various aspects of international humanitarian law.
B)

The civil war in Sierra Leone is an armed conflict.

Armed conflict is defined as any armed confrontation between: “1) two or more
States; 2) a State and a body other than a State; 3) a State and a dissident faction; and, 4)
two ethnic factions within a State.”16 A multitude of conflicts could fall under different
parts of this definition, including the Sierra Leonean conflict. The ICTY clarified this
definition of armed conflict in Prosecutor v. Tadic, stating that an armed conflict occurs:
“‘[W]henever there is…protracted violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends
beyond the cessation of hostilities until …in the case of internal conflicts, a
peaceful settlement is achieved.”17

[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 43]. “States refuse to apply
humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts for reasons that are more political than
legal.” Id. There is concern that application of humanitarian law during internal armed
conflicts “tacitly concedes that there is another ‘party’ wielding power in the putatively
sovereign state.” Id.
15

Lopez, supra note 7, at 917. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 32].

16

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 409. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].

17

Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 54). Tadic,
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 22].
7

The Rwanda tribunal also adopted the ICTY’s clarified definition of an armed conflict in
Prosecutor v. Akayesu.18
However, the clarified definition as presented by the ICTY in Tadic still does not
clearly determine whether the Sierra Leonean conflict reached the level of an armed
conflict. Protocol II suggests that the level of hostilities must surpass a minimum level of
intensity.19 The requisite level may be reached, “for example, when the hostilities are of a
collective character or when the government is obliged to use military force against the
insurgents, instead of mere police forces. Second, non-governmental groups involved in
the conflict must be considered as "parties to the conflict", meaning that they possess
organized armed forces. This means for example that these forces have to be under a
certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations.”20
In addition, the Special Court for Sierra Leone specifically referred to the Sierra
Leonean conflict as an internal armed conflict in Prosecutor v Norman.21 Combining the
jurisprudence from ICTY and the guidance given by Protocol II with the Special Court’s
judgment in Norman, the conflict in Sierra Leone no doubt seems to be an armed conflict.

18

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 409. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].

19

Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Opinion Paper: How is the term “Armed Conflict”
defined in International Humanitarian Law?, at 3 (Mar. 2008). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 48].
20

Id.

21

Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on the Defence
Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Command Responsibility (Oct. 15, 2003).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 19].
8

C)

The Sierra Leonean conflict is usually viewed as an internal armed
conflict. Thus, if it is an internal conflict, forced recruits are not
afforded combatant status under Protocol I.

Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) discussed ways to determine
the international nature (or lack thereof) of an armed conflict. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber specifically delineated a test to determine if an armed conflict reached the level
of an international armed conflict. The considerations included: 1) whether another state
intervened in the conflict through the state’s troops; or 2) whether some of the
participants in the internal armed conflict acted on behalf of another sate.22 Interestingly
enough, the Prosecutor from the ICTY successfully established the international nature of
the armed conflict in seven different cases. In the instant case of Sierra Leone, however,
it is more difficult to prove that another state formally intervened, either on its own or
through support of participants in the armed conflict.
Rather, the Sierra Leonean conflict seems to fall within the traditional Geneva
Convention definition of non-international armed conflict in Protocol II.23 The Sierra
Leonean armed conflict occurred between the Sierra Leonean army and the rebel force,
The Revolutionary Unite Front of Sierra Leone (“RUF”).24 Certainly, scholars argue that

22

Eve La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts 321 (2008) (citing Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 84 (15 July 1999). La Haye
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 45]; Tadic Appeal Judgment
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 21]
23

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 412-13. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab
24]. See also Protocol II, supra note 9, at art. 1(1) (defining a non-international armed
conflict not covered by Protocol I). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 12]
24

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 413. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].
9

the presence of Liberian fighters in the rebel forces suggests that the conflict is
characterized as more than just an internal strife. However, there is no nexus between
these Liberian fighters and the sovereign state of Liberia.25 Therefore, because the Sierra
Leonean conflict seems to fall within the classic definition, many scholars regard the
Sierra Leonean conflict as purely internal in nature.26
Assuming that the Sierra Leonean conflict is deemed purely an internal armed
conflict, legal classification of forced recruits becomes unclear. As mentioned above,
Common Article 3 and Protocol II are applicable during internal armed conflicts.
However, these treaties provide protections for civilians only—there is no mention or
discussion of combatant status or legal protections for combatants. Both combatants and
civilians, however, are afforded protections under the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (“Protocol I”).27 Nonetheless, Protocol I traditionally is inapplicable
during internal armed conflicts. This inapplicability of Protocol I during internal armed
conflicts has drastic consequences for combatants. For civilians, however, the
inapplicability of Protocol I has little effect—it seems as if the same protections in
Protocol I are also extended to civilians during internal armed conflict through Protocol

25

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 411. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].

26

Many scholars also argue that the Sierra Leonean conflict has become an
“internationalized” armed conflict. See infra, “Section I, Part D: The laws of
international armed conflict arguably apply to the Sierra Leonean conflict,” at p. 13.
27

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(3), Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter “Protocol I”). [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 11].
10

II.28 Further, Common Article 3 provides general civilian protection in addition to
prohibiting certain acts, such as murder, outrages against personal dignity, cruel
punishment, and torture, among others.29
During internal armed conflicts, Article 13 of Protocol II provides protection to
civilians from military targets and objectives. But, a civilian loses this protection the
instant he takes direct part in the hostilities.30 While a civilian loses this protection, the
civilian does not simultaneously lose his civilian status during an internal armed conflict.
As stated above, there is no special designation between combatants and civilians during
internal armed conflicts. Thus, when a civilian takes a direct part in the hostilities, he
will not be granted privileges or protections as a combatant—at the same time, the
civilian will also not be granted civilian protections. Nonetheless, it seems that his legal
status would continue as a civilian.31 Certainly, any unlawful actions in which the citizen

28

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 419. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].
See also Int’l Comm. Of Red Cross, Commentary: Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims During NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), ¶ 4762 (J. Pictet ed. 1987) (hereinafter
“Commentary to Protocol II”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 2].
29

1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 9, at art. 3. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tabs 6–9].
30

Commentary to Protocol II, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 4787–89. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 2].
31

The Supreme Court of Israel, in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Government of Israel, suggested that Article 51(3) of Protocol I is an international norm
and part of customary international law. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren Michaeli, Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf>. Supreme
Court of Israel, Sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 459, 461 (2007). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 36]. Article
51(3) of Protocol I states “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Protocol I, supra note
11

or forced recruit participates would lead to criminal liability, including such crimes as
murder and treason.32
In the instant case, the rebel groups required many of the forced recruits to
actively participate in the hostilities. While there is little jurisprudence specifically
defining the legal status of a civilian taking part in hostilities during internal armed
conflict, states are not obliged to recognize combatant privileges to those taking part in
hostilities.33 Thus, it seems that the forced recruits would be considered civilians and
therefore, would be completely liable for any participation during the internal armed
conflict.34

27, at art. 51(3). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 11]. The Israeli
Supreme Court held that civilians who take part in the hostilities do not lose their civilian
status; rather, they lose their civilian protections during such time as they take part in the
hostilities. Ben-Naftali, supra note 31, at 461. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook
at Tab 36].
32

The Special Court for Sierra Leone is a hybrid court, and the Court can prosecute
offenders either under international law or local Sierra Leonean law. Therefore, it is
possible that a forced recruit could be liable under either international law or domestic
Sierra Leonean law.
33

Waldemar A. Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts
Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 59 (1983).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 42].
34

Enslavement is considered a crime against humanity, which is generally targeted at
civilian populations. See “Section III, Enslavement and Forced Labour Do Not Affect a
Forced Recruit’s Legal Status,” infra at p. 31, dealing with the overlap between civilian
status and enslavement.
12

D)

The laws of international armed conflict arguably apply to the Sierra
Leonean conflict.

International armed conflict typically exists when two sovereign states engage in
hostilities, thus triggering international humanitarian law (“IHL”; also know as the laws
of armed conflict). International armed conflict includes:
“1) the use of force in a warlike manner between States, whether or not
they recognize themselves being at war; 2) all ‘measures short of war’
whether or not they are compatible with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter;
and 3) wars of national liberation as set out in Article 1(4) of the 1977
Protocol I Addition to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.”35
The Sierra Leonean conflict superficially appears to be purely an internal
conflict.36 While other nationals, including Liberians, were involved in the conflict, the
principal actors were Sierra Leoneans, and no State was formally at war with Sierra
Leone.37 However, there were also “external dimensions” involved in the conflict.38 The
Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) provided support to the
elected Sierra Leonean government overthrown during the conflict through the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (“ECOMOG”) troops.39 On
August 30, 1997, ECOWAS mandated ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the RUF

35

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 410 (internal citations omitted). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].
36

See supra, “Section 1, Part C: The Sierra Leonean conflict is usually viewed as an
internal armed conflict. Thus, if it is an internal conflict, forced recruits are not afforded
combatant status under Protocol I,” at p. 9.
37

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 410. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].

38

Id. at 414.

39

Id. at 398, 404.
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and to restore constitutional order in Sierra Leone.40 The ECOMOG subsequently joined
the U.N. peace-keeping efforts in Sierra Leone, with most of the ECOMOG’s 15,000
soldiers being replaced by U.N. soldiers.41
While the conflict in Sierra Leone is primarily of an internal character, there can
also be an argument that the presence of ECOMOG troops42, in particular, gave the
conflict international dimensions. If this were the case, it could be argued that all four
Geneva Conventions and both Additional Protocols therefore would apply. One
commentator addressed this issue of intervention by outside forces and stated that:
“In the case of peace-keeping interventions by UN forces or UN
authorized forces in an internal armed conflict, the UN troops do not
become party to the conflict and are often allowed to use force only in
restricted cases of self-defense. It is therefore possible to think that the
involvement of such peace-keeping forces in an internal armed conflict
will not change the nature of the conflict. In those cases, the UN troops
strive to remain neutral and the very occasional use of force is self defense
should not decisively affect the same nature of the armed conflict.
If the character of the UN forces is not peace-keeping but peace-enforcing
or peace-restoring, the forces’ mandate…may allow them to use force to
restore peace and security in the country. In those circumstances, it seems
that the UN forces can therefore become part to the armed conflict and the
nature of the conflict will be changed to an international conflict.”43

40

Id. at 404. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sierra Leone: The Role of the Int’l
Community, http://humanrightswatch.net/worldreport99/africa/sierraleone3.html. Human
Rights Watch, [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 46].
41

Id.

42

Human Rights Watch, supra note 40. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 46].
43

Haye, supra note 22, at 19–20. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 45].
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UN forces were sent to Sierra Leone to restore the peace in the late 1990s. Their
combined efforts with the ECOMOG suggest that perhaps the conflict in Sierra Leone
could be considered an international conflict.
Human Rights Watch further suggests that the most basic standards of
international humanitarian law, that have acquired the status of customary international
law, are binding on all forces operating in Sierra Leone, including those operating under
the U.N.-endorsed ECOMOG mandate.44 In fact, a study conducted by the International
Committee of the Red Cross found that state practice has developed a more complete
regulation of internal conflicts under customary law than in treaty law.45 Further, the
study argues that the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols is reflected
in customary international law.46 According to the study, both governmental armed
forces and rebel forces are bound by these customary rules and can be held accountable
in case of non-compliance.47
Further, recognition of belligerency by the Sierra Leone government during the
armed conflict can change the nature of the internal armed conflict. When belligerency is
applied to internal armed conflict, “it means that the level of conflict has risen to the
point where the State recognizes a state of belligerency, as opposed to mere insurgency,

44

Human Rights Watch, supra note 40, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/intlaw.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 46].
45

The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_2/2425.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 50].
46

Id.

47

Id.
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or rebellion.”48 While there was no formal agreement or recognition of belligerency by
the Sierra Leonean government, the International Committee of the Red Cross called
upon the parties to “respect the relevant provisions of humanitarian law, stressing the
adherence of Sierra Leone to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols.”49 Even though no recognition of belligerency occurred, it is clear the Sierra
Leone was encouraged to adopt a broader spectrum of protections through the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols.
E)

Extending combatant privileges to the rebel groups, and in turn, to
the forced recruits, is advantageous for the Sierra Leonean conflict.

Failure to extend combatant status to forced recruits raises intricate policy
considerations. On the one hand, there is certainly a desire to protect State sovereignty
from rebellious groups who could hide under the protections of a legal combatant.
However, it could also be argued that, by refraining to extend combatant privileges to the
rebel groups, the rebels have no incentive to abide by customary international
humanitarian law, including Common Article 3 or Protocol II.50 In other words, the

48

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 422 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997) “the ICTY noted that it is an established principle
of customary international law that the laws of war might become applicable to noninternational armed conflicts of a certain intensity through the doctrine of “recognition of
belligerency.”). Akinrinade [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 24]; Tadic
Trial Opinion and Judgment [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 23].
49

Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 425 (emphasis added). [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 24].
50

Solf, supra note 33, at 65. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 42].
Interestingly, even though some would not recognize the rebel groups as legal
combatants, the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone still holds individuals from
these groups criminally responsible for breaches of customary international law under
Common Article 3 and Protocol II. See generally Statue for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, supra note 6. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 15].
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RUF, for example, would have no motivation to ensure that they targeted only
combatants during military strikes.
Further, as mentioned above, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were originally
created to deal with the atrocities of World War II and international conflicts. However,
over the last few decades, an evolution in armed conflict has occurred, where most
conflicts have shifted to internal conflicts. While most of the Geneva Conventions do not
technically apply to internal conflicts, customary international law suggests otherwise.
For example, the ICTY observed in Strugar that attacks on civilian objects, which
are protected by Protocol I (only applicable during international armed conflicts), are
nevertheless illegal due to an evolution of rules applicable to all armed conflicts, be they
international or internal conflicts. “The Appeals Chamber noted that already during the
Spanish Civil War the tendency to disregard the distinction between international and
internal armed conflicts could be observed.” The Chamber concluded that despite the
lack of a provision in Protocol II, the general rule prohibiting attacks on civilian objects
also applies to internal conflicts.51
Further, Common Article 3 actually encourages the Parties to the conflict “to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the

51

Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 224 (Jan. 31, 2005)
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 20]. See also Prosecutor v.
Hadzihasanovic et al., Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, ¶ 29 (July 16, 2003)
(holding that “the non-reference in Protocol II to command responsibility in relation to
internal armed conflicts did not necessarily affect the question whether command
responsibility previously existed as part of customary international law relating to
internal armed conflicts.”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 16].
17

present Convention.”52 It is unclear based on the agreements between the Sierra Leonean
government and the RUF whether such stipulations were made. However, Sierra Leone
did ratify Protocol I on October 21, 1996. 53 Thus, sound public policy seems to dictate
application of all of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the Sierra Leonean conflict.
Finally, the jurisdictional choices of the Special Court seem to also suggest a
broader application of treaty law than just Common Article 3 and Protocol II. The statute
delineates crimes included in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and
encompasses more international crimes than does the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.54 For example, the ICTR statute criminalizes rape, but the Statute for the
Special Court expands the liability for rape to explicitly include sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence.55 The Statute for
the Special Court also includes an additional Article outlining criminal liability that the
ICTR Statute does not include. Largely inspired by the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal, these additional offenses include: 1) committing an
attack against a civilian population; 2) committing an attack against peace-keeping

52

1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 9, at art. 3. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tabs 6–9]. See also Akinrinade, supra note 11, at 423–24. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 24].
53

See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, Parties to Protocol I,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 49].
54

Haye, supra note 22, at 147. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 45].

55

Compare Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 6, at art. 2(g), with
Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Sierra Leone, [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 15]; Rwanda, [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 14].
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personnel; and 3) abducting and forcefully recruiting children under the age of fifteen.56
Finally, the Special Court also has jurisdiction over children ages fifteen to eighteen years
old—this type of jurisdiction has yet to be exercised in the international community.57
While the Statute for the Special Court is similar to the ICTR Statute, the differences
suggest that the Special Court crafted the statute to reflect the specific problems that
occurred in Sierra Leone.58 The additional liability included in the Statute for the Special
Court “seems to indicate…that more principles and crimes apply in internal conflicts than
those stemming [solely] from Common Article 3 or Protocol II.”59
Thus, in keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and based on the
arguments above, it seems most advantageous to extend Protocol I, and in turn,
combatant privileges, to the Sierra Leonean conflict. For the next section of this
memorandum, the legal classification of forced recruits will be viewed under the
assumption that Protocol I applies to the specific conflict in Sierra Leone.

56

Haye, supra note 22, at 146. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 45]. See
also Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 6, at art. 5, with Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Statute of
SCSL, [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 15]; Rome Statute, [Reproduced
in accompanying Notebook at Tab 13].
57

Haye, supra note 22, at 145. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 45]

58

Id. at 146.

59

Id. at 147.
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II)

PROTOCOL I DELINEATES BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND
COMBATANTS.
A)

Protocol I protects civilians with immunity from targeting by military
objectives.

It is important to distinguish during periods of armed conflicts between the
civilian population and those generally involved in the military attacks, because an
individual’s rights change when his classification changes.60 The Geneva Conventions
adopted Additional Protocol I in order to protect civilian populations from attack and, in
turn, force the burden on combatant forces to clearly and accurately plan military
objectives to avoid harming the civilian population.61 Protocol I, which is applicable in
some armed conflicts, supra, attempts to protect civilian populations and those involved
in the military attacks by delineating between civilians and combatants. Protocol I,
however, makes no provision for intermediate categories, such as a quasi-combatant.
One is either a civilian or a combatant,62 because the spirit of the Geneva Conventions
suggests that “’[N]o one can fall in between the two categories and therefore be protected
by neither.’”63 Article 50(a) states that “a civilian is any person who does not belong to

60

Abresch, supra note 14, at 757. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 43].

61

Hamilton DeSaussure, Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction, 31 AM. U. L.
REV. 883, 886 (1982). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 29].
62

Id.

63

Barbara J. Falk, The Global War on Terror and the Detention Debate: The
Applicability of Geneva Convention III, 3 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 31, 48–49 (2007).
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 25].
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one of the categories of persons referred to [as a prisoner of war or a combatant]. In case
of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”64
Further, Protocol I also states that the civilian population and individual civilians
shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations and shall
not be the object of military attacks.65 Thus, when an individual is classified as a civilian,
he receives greater protections and immunities than does a combatant.
B)

Protocol I also grants privileges to combatants.

A combatant, on the other hand, does not receive immunity from attack. Thus, as
a combatant, an individual loses the right to not be attacked at any time, during periods of
active and in-active hostilities. Essentially, a combatant gives up his right to life under
international humanitarian law.66 But, a combatant does receive privileges related to the
act of war. A combatant, as defined in Protocol I, is a member of the armed forces of a
party who has the right to participate directly in hostilities.67 Thus, a combatant cannot
be prosecuted for the murder of enemy combatants.68 Note, that while Protocol I does
allow combatants to take part in hostilities, the action must still conform to the laws of
armed conflict. Therefore, combatants can, and are, held criminally liable for illegal
actions, such as enslavement or other crimes against humanity.

64

Protocol I, supra note 27, at art. 50(1). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11].
65

Id. at art. 51(1)–(2).

66

Albresch, supra note 14, at 757. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 43].

67

Protocol I, supra note 27, at art. 43(2). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11].
68

Albresch, supra note 14, at 757. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 43].
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Finally, all members of the armed forces are considered combatants, and only
members of the armed forces are combatants.69 This further delineates the distinction
between civilian and combatants—a civilian must be considered a member of the armed
forces before he can be considered a combatant. Thus, there could be a preference to be
distinguished either as a civilian or a combatant, since different privileges and protections
attach based on the legal classification.
From one perspective, the Sierra Leonean forced recruits may want to be
classified as combatants. This way, the forced recruits would not be criminally liable for
any activities committed within the confines of IHL. However, even as a combatant, the
forced recruit could still be liable for certain crimes.70 But, if the forced recruit were
classified as a civilian, then the forced recruit should be protected from any military
attacks. Thus, it seems that the forced recruit’s activity is highly indicative and will
directly affect the recruit’s legal classification.

69

Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), ¶ 1677 (J. Pictet ed. 1987) (emphasis added) (hereinafter
“Commentary to Protocol I”). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 1].
70

Many forced recruits claims duress as a defense for their actions. But, as discussed
below in “Section IV: Mitigating factors and defenses can have an effect on the outcome
of a forced recruit’s fate.”, infra at p. 34, duress is rarely a complete bar to prosecution,
but rather, serves as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
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C)

Protocol I, in reality, creates a blurred line between civilians and
combatants; thus, the types of activities in which a forced recruit
engages should be indicative of his civilian or combatant status.
(1)

Protocol I restricts immunity from civilians taking part in
hostilities.

The policy consideration in delineating between civilian populations, while at the
same time preventing civilians from taking part in the hostilities, is to prevent any
confusion between who is a civilian and who is not. If combatants are unable to
distinguish between the enemy combatant and civilians, then the combatant has difficulty
preventing attacks on the civilian population and in turn, abiding by the laws of
international humanitarian law. It should be noted that a combatant’s violation of civilian
protections is considered a grave breach by Article 85(3)(a) of Protocol I.71 Therefore, in
order to protect combatants from waging inappropriate attacks and to incentivize civilians
to not take part in the hostilities,72 Protocol I indicates that any civilian who directly
participates in the hostilities temporarily loses his immunity protection under the law.73
The Commentary related to this restriction emphasizes the need to refrain from
participation and elaborates on what is defined as a hostile act. The Commentary states:
The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to an overriding
condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts. Hostile acts

71

Protocol I, supra note 27, at art. 85(3)(a). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11]. See also W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 117
(1990). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 41].
72

Yoram Dinstein, Interstate Armed Conflict and Wars of National Liberation, 31 AM. U.
L. REV. 849, 852 (1982). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 44].
73

Protocol I, supra note 27, at art. 51(3) (emphasis added). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 11].
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should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed
forces. Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat, either individually
or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target, though only for
as long as he takes part in hostilities.74
The first important element in the Commentary’s elaboration is the definition of a
direct participation. The ICRC further states in the Commentary that a civilian “may
directly participate in hostilities by using a weapon, carrying a weapon for use in
hostilities, or ‘undertak[ing] hostile acts without using a weapon.”75 Antonio Cassese, a
renowned legal scholar on international law, similarly defined direct participation as a
civilian “’engaging in military deployment’ preceding an attack if ‘he carries arms openly
during the military deployment.’”76 However, the Israeli Supreme Court took a broader
approach and defined direct participation as performing any function of a combatant. 77 78

74

Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 69, at ¶ 1942 (emphasis added). [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 1].
75

Kristen E. Eichensehr, On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of
Targeted Killings, 116 YALE L.J. 1873, 1874 (2007) (citing Commentary to Protocol I,
supra note 111, at ¶ 1943). Eichensehr, [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 31]; Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 69, [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 1].
76

Eichensehr, supra note 75, at 1874. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 31].
77

See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Direct Participation in Hostilities,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205,
(stating that “it has been suggested, for example, that direct participation not only
includes activities involving the delivery of violence, but also acts aimed at protecting
personnel, infrastructure or materiel. It has even been suggested that the determination of
direct participation rests on the appreciation of the value added brought to the war effort
by a civilian post as compared to a purely military activity.”).
78

Eichensehr, supra note 75, at 1874. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 31]. See also George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and its Pathologies, 38 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 529 (2007) (stating that the Israeli High Court recognizes that “’a
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The approach by the Israeli Supreme Court seems a bit inconsistent with the idea that an
individual is either a civilian or a combatant and perhaps blurs the line even more than
Protocol I does on its own. Thus, the idea of direct participation does not clearly
delineate the line between civilian and combatant.
However, the second important element of the ICRC’s Commentary relating to
the temporal element of hostility participation is clearer. A civilian retains his protections
so long as he is not directly participating. The Commentary specifically does not
mention a loss of civilian status based on their participation, but merely a loss of
immunity from attack.79

civilian preparing to commit hostilities might be considered a person who is taking a
direct part in hostilities, if he is openly bearing arms. When he lays down his weapon, or
when he is not committing hostilities, he ceases to be a legitimate target for attack. Thus,
a person who merely aids the planning of hostilities or sends others to commit hostilities
is not a legitimate target for attack. Such indirect aid to hostilities might expose the
civilian to arrest and trial, but it cannot turn him into a legitimate target for attack.’” Id.
The Israeli Supreme Court seems to suggest that the aforementioned activities would not
be indicative of activities performed by a combatant. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 27]. See, contra, Maj. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater:
How Weak Accountability Over Private Security Contractors Significantly Undermines
Counterinsurgency Efforts, 2008-JUL ARMY LAW. 64, 70 (2008) (stating that a small
portion of the international community view preparation, similar to what a General would
perform in a military army, as combatant activity even though there is no “direct”
participation in the hostilities. However, the majority approach, followed by most of the
international community, defines a “direct attack” as any “‘[act] of war which by [its]
nature or purpose [is] likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the
enemy armed forces.’” Mere preparation is not sufficient to be direct participation.). Id.
(citing Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 1944–45). Thurnher [Reproduced
in accompanying Notebook at Tab 34]; Commentary to Protocol I [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 1].
79

Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 1942, 1944. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 1]. See also Ben-Naftali, supra note 31, at 461.
[Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 36].
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Thus, it seems that a more precise definition is needed in order to characterize
between civilians participating in hostile activities and combatants. It has been suggested
that during the Sierra Leonean conflict, “children who participate[d] in combat [lost] their
civilian status under international humanitarian law,” but they retained their civilian
status during the initial abduction and forced recruitment.80 Analogizing to the current
situation with forced recruits over the age of 15 years old, it seems that a shift in legal
status should be based on a combination of a temporal and type of activity element. In
other words, once forced recruits begin actively and directly participating in the hostile
activities, their status should shift from civilian to combatant.
(2)

Civilians can become Combatants.

In previous discussions above, it seems apparent that a civilian can shift their
status to become a combatant. The Geneva Conventions do outline ways to distinguish
combatants from civilians (i.e. by carrying arms openly, wearing a uniform, or displaying
insignia on his clothing), but in light of modern guerilla warfare, these provisions are not
as helpful or useful.81 Commentary to Protocol I, however, elaborates on who is a
member of the armed forces, by stating that “a civilian who is incorporated in an armed
organization… becomes a member of the military and a combatant throughout the
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Sarah L. Wells, Crimes Against Child Soldiers in Armed Conflict Situations:
Application and Limits of International Humanitarian Law, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
287, 300 (2004). Further, the article stated that any “children who were abducted by
armed groups and did not take an active or direct part I hostilities should be considered
civilians for the purposes of international humanitarian law.” Id. [Reproduced in
accompanying Notebook at Tab 38].
81

Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 44(3). [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook at
Tab 11].
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duration of the hostilities (or in any case, until he is permanently demobilized by the
responsible command…, whether or not he is in combat, or for the time being armed.).”82
The key element in determining when a civilian’s status shift is their
incorporation into the armed forced itself. This incorporation can be determined by the
types of activities and the elapsed time since becoming part of the armed forced. Recall,
supra at note 69, that all members of the armed forced are combatants, and only members
of armed forces are combatants.83 “Whether [combatants] actually engage in firing
weapons is not important. They are entitled to do so, which does not apply to either
medical or religious personnel, despite their status as members of the armed forces, or to
civilians, as they are not members of the armed forces.”84
In the instant case, after a forced recruit was conscripted into the army, it seems
that his status would be classified as a combatant under the assumption that he was
incorporated into the armed forces and he directly participated in hostilities. In contrast,
if the forced recruit were solely conscripted to work in the diamond mines, for example,
his participation would not likely rise to the level of “incorporation” into the armed
forces. Thereby, the forced recruit working in the diamond mines would retain his
civilian status.
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Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 69, at ¶ 1677. [Reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 1].
83

Id.

84

Id.
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(3)

Civilians can be Present among the Armed Forces.

Because civilians can be present among armed forces, the definition as set forth
by Protocol I is again blurred. The Third Geneva Convention states that “persons who
accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof include civilian
members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
labour units or service responsible for the welfare of the armed forces.”85 When
considering the presence of civilian among armed forces, it seems especially relevant to
look at the types of activities the civilian is performing and how long the civilian has
been performing those activities. For example, a war correspondent, who is considered a
civilian according to Article 4(A), supra note 85, would not directly participate in the
activities. Similarly, if a forced recruit were not directly participating in the hostilities, it
certainly could be argued that the forced recruit retains his civilian status. Retaining
civilian status could be advantageous to a forced recruit, because he could then be
protected by the immunity from Protocol I and IHL generally.
(4)

Combatants can Still be Victims of Crimes Against Humanity.

Not only is it important to define persons legally as citizens or combatants for
protection and privilege purposes during armed conflict, but it is also important to define
a civilian for the purposes of establishing crimes against humanity. Crimes against
humanity are considered “crimes that are part of a wide-spread or systematic attack
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against any civilian population.”86 Such crimes include murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery, persecution based
on ideologies, or other inhumane acts.87 In Prosecutor v. Mrskic, the Prosecution
suggests that civilian, as defined under the ICTY statute, is any person not the lawful
object of attack (i.e. one who does not participate in hostilities) under Protocol I and
international humanitarian law.88 As discussed above, this ability for a civilian to lose its
immunity creates a problem when distinguishing between civilians and combatants.
However, the ICTY did not limit crimes against humanity to affect only civilian
populations. In Prosecutor v. Mrskic, the Tribunal held that “combatants can be victims
of crimes against humanity even though they do not fall within the definition of a
civilian. This would be in situations in which they are targeted in a manner that is
unlawful under IHL, [such as during forced conscription or enslavement].”89 The ICTY’s
holding suggests that a Sierra Leonean forced recruit’s status as either a civilian or
combatant would not affect any protections or immunities he would receive to be free
from perpetuation of crimes against humanity.
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(5)

A constant “shift” of legal classification provides an unfeasible
definition.

Ultimately, Protocol I seems to create a shifting spectrum of when a civilian is
protected. For example, a civilian could take part in the hostilities during the day, but
then regain his “civilian protection” at night when he is not actively involved in the
hostilities. As discussed above, it seems as if a civilian does not lose his status as a
“civilian” when taking part in the hostilities. But, the international community generally
recognizes the need to avoid “quasi-combatant” status. Thus, this conundrum creates a
blurring of lines between the definitions of civilian and combatant, and from a policy
perspective, it is best to have more of a bright line rule.
ICRC addressed this important goal of eliminating a shifting status, specifically
with combatant status. In the Commentary to Protocol I, the ICRC suggests that any
definition that would allow a combatant to shift his status based on his activities (i.e.
fighting during a siege as a combatant to becoming a civilian in the armed forces camp
while he is eating) is unworkable and unfeasible.90 Thus, Protocol I explicitly “does not
allow [a] combatant to have the status of a combatant while he is in action, and the status
of a civilian at other times.”91
In considering the legal status of the forced recruits during the Sierra Leonean
conflict, the following should be incorporated into the analysis: 1) the types of activities
in which the forced recruit participates (i.e. is there likely to be harm to the enemy
combatant or is the forced recruit engaged in mere preparation or labour within the armed
90
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forces camp); and 2) whether, and at what time, the forced recruit has been
“incorporated” into the armed forces.
III)

ENSLAVEMENT AND FORCED LABOUR DO NOT AFFECT A
FORCED RECRUIT’S LEGAL STATUS.
A)

The key element to enslavement is ownership.

The 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a
person over whom any or all the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.”92 The ICTY considered the following elements to be indicative or relevant of
enslavement: 1) detention; 2) requirement to do everything that they were ordered to do;
3) asserting exclusivity for use over a particular individual; 4) the enslaved person was
always available and at the captor’s disposal; 5) captor’s ability to sell the enslaved
person; and 6) the enslaved person was denied any control over her life.93 The required
mens rea for enslavement is the captor’s international exercise of a power attached to the
right of ownership over the victims. However, the ICTY did not maintain that the captor
has to intend to detain the enslaved person for prolonged periods in order to constitute a
crime of enslavement.94
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Much of the jurisprudence related to slavery involves female recruits that are held
captive for sexual slavery and prostitution. However, it has been suggested that forced
child recruits are enslaved under customary international law. “The children who are
abducted and used as child soldiers are abused badly and enslaved, especially because
they are not permitted to leave or return home to the comforts of their family.”95 Clearly,
there is an element of ownership with forced conscription. However, the distinguishing
factor between classifying child soldiers as enslaved and forced recruits above the age of
15 years old involves the fact that forced conscription of children is illegal.96 Forced
conscription for military purposes can be legal, assuming that certain age requirements
are met. Thus, the lack of jurisprudence addressing enslavement of forced recruits over
the age of 15 suggests that the Sierra Leonean forced recruits were not enslaved.
B)

Forced Recruits engage in forced labour.

However, a sub-category of enslavement is forced or involuntary labour. While
forced or involuntary labour is not considered a crime against humanity, the International
Labor Organization (“ILO”) adopted two conventions in order to attempt to eliminate any
kind of forced labour. The first convention, held in 1930, attempted to suppress forced
labour, while the convention held in 1957 abolished all forms of compulsory labour as a
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means of political coercion.97 ILO considered the following definition of forced labour in
during the 1930 Convention: “forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”98 However, it should be noted that
work or service performed in virtue of compulsory military laws for work of a purely
military character is exempted from the definition of forced labour.99 If this were not the
case, the forced conscription or a military draft would in turn be illegal. But, in the
instant case, Sierra Leone did not have any compulsory military laws in place. Therefore,
it seems as if the forced recruit’s labour, be it directly participating in hostilities or mere
preparation or work within the armed forces’ camp would still be considered forced
labour.
Nonetheless, the ICTY has indicated that international law does not prohibit all
labour by protected persons during armed conflict. To establish that the labour was in
fact forced labour, one must prove that the person performing the labour had not real
choice as to whether they would work. The ICTY urged that this analysis be performed
on a case-by-case basis.100
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It is unclear the effect of the ICTY’s ruling that some forced labour is permitted
by international law. However, in looking at a forced recruit’s legal status, whether the
recruit performed compulsory illegal or legal labour does not seem to affect his
underlying status as a civilian or a combatant. The only material effect enslavement or
forced labour could have on the prosecution of a forced recruit would be through an
affirmative defense.
IV)

MITIGATING FACTORS AND DEFENSES CAN HAVE AN EFFECT ON
THE OUTCOME OF A FORCED RECRUIT’S FATE.
A)

Status as a Combatant allows a forced recruit to engage in legal
hostile activities.

As discussed, supra, a forced recruit classified as a combatant can claim the
privilege afforded to him under Protocol I. In other words, as long as the forced recruit’s
conduct is within the legal limits of international humanitarian law, the recruit will not be
held liable for his actions. However, if his actions as a combatant fall under crimes
against humanity or other international crimes as mentioned in the Statute for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone,101 then his conduct would have criminal implications, and no
combatant privilege would be available.
B)

Forced recruits between the ages of 15 and 18 years old receive less
severe sentences.

Forced recruits engaged either as civilians or combatants whose conduct is illegal
are not exempt from criminal liability. However, their young age can act as a mitigating
factor during sentencing. The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that
children between the ages of 15 and 18 years old shall be treated with dignity, taking into
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account the young age and desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation and
reintegration into society.102 Further, the Special Court can order any of the following as
punishment for criminal liability for children between the ages of 15 and 18 years old:
“care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counselling, foster
care, correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools
and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or
programmes of child protection agencies.”103 Clearly, the Special Court would rather
focus on reintegration than punishment for the forced recruits who committed crimes at a
young age.
In addition, the international community recognizes that children who commit an
offense before they reach eighteen years old cannot receive the death penalty for that
offense.104
C)

Duress can only be a mitigating factor in sentencing.

Generally, duress is not recognized as bar to criminal liability in international
criminal law. However, duress can be used as a mitigating defense during sentencing.
The ICTY explored the use of duress as an excuse in the Erdemovic trial. Erdemovic was
essentially told to either participate in killing innocent civilians through a fire squad or
consider himself as someone who would be shot by the firing squad. However, the ICTY
held that “no rule may be found in customary international law regarding the availability
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or the non-availability of duress as a defense to a charge of killing innocent human
beings.”105 While the Statute for the Special Court does not recognize duress as a
defense, the Court would recognize duress as an excuse during sentence mitigation as a
part of customary international law.106
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